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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs, 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Docket No. 2004-0192CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Appellee agrees with and stipulates to the Appellant's 
Jurisdictional Statement which appears on Page 1 of his Brief 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue Number 1: Did the trial court abuse the broad 
discretion afforded to it in making its modified alimony award? 
Issue Number 2: Was the trial correct when it imputed to 
Mr. Jones his previously demonstrated earnings after determining 
Mr. Jones was voluntarily underemployed and thus continued to 
have the ability to provide spousal support? 
Issue Number 3: Did the trial court correctly apply UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 78-45-9.3(4) when it declined to made its modification 
order retroactive to the date the Appellant filed his Petition 
to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative to 
this Court's consideration of the issues presented, above: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8) 
(a) MThe court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor 
children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business 
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to 
any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of 
living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
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alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court 
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living 
that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during 
the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties1 respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold 
of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration 
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during 
the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
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material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of 
the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order 
for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist 
ait the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent 
spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in 
this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's 
financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent 
spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct 
justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time 
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer 
period of time." 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-9.3(4) 
"A child or spousal support payment under a child support order 
may be modified with respect to any period during which a 
modification is pending, but only from the date of service of 
the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, 
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or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. If the 
tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the 
effective date of the modification shall be the month following 
service on the parent whose support is affected. Once the 
tribunal determines that a modification is appropriate, the 
tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any difference 
in the original order and the modified amount for the period 
from the service of the pleading until the final order of 
modification is entered." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a modification of a stipulated 
Decree of Divorce entered by the trial court in 1992 after 21 
years of marriage. The Appellant filed his Verified Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce [Alimony Provisions] on October 19, 
2001, seeking to reduce or eliminate his stipulated and court-
ordered alimony obligation to the Appellee. 
Course of Litigation: The parties stipulated to the terms 
of their Decree of Divorce entered by the Court on July 14, 
1992. Due to the Appellant's failure to pay his stipulated and 
ordered alimony obligations, the Appellee moved for an Order to 
Show Cause seeking judgment from and a contempt sanction against 
the Appellant and on October 16, 2001, the Appellant was served 
with the trial court's Order to Show Cause issued October 9, 
2001. The Appellant filed his Petition to Modify on October 19, 
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2001. The Appellee accepted service of the Appellant's Petition 
to Modify and filed her Answer on November 16, 2001. 
On November 13, 2001, a $2,800.00 judgment was entered 
against the Appellant for alimony arrearages and his contempt of 
court was certified for an evidentiary hearing. This 
evidentiary hearing took place on May 8, 2002, at which time the 
trial court found the Appellant in contempt of court and imposed 
an additional judgment of $9,800.00 to be paid within six (6) 
months after the trial court's order. See, Order and Judgment 
Re: Contempt, Attorney's Fees, Alimony Arrears and Other 
Matters. As of December 2002, the Appellant had failed to 
satisfy the $9,800.00 judgment against him and failed to remain 
current in his ongoing alimony obligation. The Appellee moved 
for a second Order to Show Cause seeking an additional arrearage 
judgment and additional contempt sanctions against the 
Appellant. These issues were certified for an evidentiary 
hearing, as well. 
The trial court held a second evidentiary hearing on June 
4, 2003, at which time the Appellant was found in contempt once 
more and ordered to serve 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
The court allowed the Appellant to purge his contempt by 
tendering an immediate $1,000.00 payment to the Appellee and by 
making $100.00 monthly minimum payments to the Appellee through 
the trial of the Appellant's Petition to Modify. 
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Trial Proceedings. A one-half day trial was held on August 
14, 2003. Both parties were present and represented by their 
present counsel of record. Both parties were placed under oath 
and testified at the trial of this matter. 
The Appellant testified the he voluntarily terminated his 
employment with the Lawson Company in 2001, which had 
consistently paid him an income of at least $70,000.00 per year 
and sometimes as much as $160,000.00 per year. Further, the 
Appellant testified that upon his voluntary termination from 
Lawson he received a $62,000.00 lump sum retirement payment and 
had received approximately $120,000.00 from his mother's estate. 
The Appellant testified that he used these monies to move to 
Montana, purchase a new home and a new car, among other things. 
When he moved to Montana, the Appellant had not secured new 
employment near his new residence nor had he actively sought 
employment that would compensate him near his historic rate. 
At the time of the parties' divorce the Appellee earned 
approximately $25,000.00 per year. At the time of trial of the 
Petition to Modify, the Appellee earned approximately $48,000.00 
per year. The Appellee further testified to her ongoing living 
expenses, her lifestyle and the financial hardship brought about 
by the Appellant's failure to provide any meaningful financial 
support to her for nearly two (2) years. The trial court found 
that the Appellee's attested monthly living expenses were 
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reasonable and, in fact, to have been understated with regard to 
the Appellee's professional clothing needs. 
Based on the testimony of the parties and documentary 
exhibits adduced, the trial court found that the Appellee had a 
monthly financial need of $500.00 per month and that the 
Appellant had to ability provide financial assistance to the 
Petitioner in this amount. Therefore, the trial court granted 
to Appellant's Petition to Modify and reduced his alimony 
obligation from $1,400.00 to $500.00 per month. The Appellant 
appeals from both the amount and the duration of the trial 
court's modified alimony award. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Alan") and the 
Appellee (hereinafter referred to "Lynda") were divorced by the 
trial court on July 14, 1992. Both parties were represented by 
counsel in the underlying divorce action and the parties 
stipulated to the terms of the resulting Decree of Divorce. The 
Decree of Divorce provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he 
[Appellant/Respondent] is hereby ordered to pay the 
[Appellee/Petitioner] $905.00 each month for alimony during the 
period that the child support order is to be paid. After the 
child support terminates, it is hereby ordered that the alimony 
award shall automatically increase to $1,400.00 each month." 
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See, Decree of Divorce at Paragraph 5. Alan's child support 
obligation ceased in 1993. 
At the time of divorce the Lawson Company employed Alan as 
a sales manager. Alan had consistently earned approximately 
$100,000.00 from his employment. Alan remained employed by 
Lawson until 2001 when Alan voluntarily resigned his position 
with Lawson. Alan claimed his resignation was influenced by a 
restructuring of the sales division at Lawson, which he claimed 
would have had a negative impact on his income, but he failed to 
provide any proof of this at trial. Further, Alan testified at 
trial that he received a $62,000.00 lump sum retirement payment 
from Lawson after he quit. After quitting Lawson, Alan and his 
new wife moved to Montana in September 2001. Alan testified 
that he had not secured employment in Montana at the time of his 
move. It was in September 2001 that Alan ceased making any 
voluntary alimony payments to Lynda. 
In May 2002, Alan was hospitalized after suffering an 
esophageal tear. Alan required emergency surgery and was 
comatose for ten (10) days. Alan testified at trial that his 
injury and medical complications were a result of his drug and 
alcohol abuse. Despite the trial court's directive, at trial 
Alan failed to provide any documentation of any presently 
existing medical conditions from which he may be suffering that 
would prevent him from seeking full time employment. See, Order 
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and Judgement Contempt (sic) and Other Matters entered July 17, 
2003, at Paragraph 3. Alan testified at trial that he was 
working full-time as a delivery truck driver for Good Will 
Industries and earns $8.00, or $16,640.00 per year from this 
employment. 
During the pendency of his Petition to Modify, Alan was 
twice held in contempt of court for failing to pay his ordered 
alimony obligations and for failing to promptly satisfy 
judgments entered by the trial court. First, Lynda filed an 
Order to Show Cause in October 2001, wherein judgment was 
entered against Alan in the amount of $2,800.00 as and for 
unpaid alimony for the month of September and October, 2001. 
Further, Alan's contempt of Court for failing to pay his alimony 
was certified for evidentiary hearing. 
Despite this initial judgment, Alan continued in his 
failure to pay his Court-ordered alimony obligation. When an 
evidentiary hearing was held before this Court on May 8, 2002, 
the judgment against Alan was increased to $12,600.00. Alan was 
also held in contempt of Court and sentenced to 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail, which was temporarily purged by his 
immediate tendering of the initial $2,800.00 judgment amount. 
Alan was ordered to pay the $9,800.00 balance of the judgment 
against him within six (6) months to avoid serving the 30 day 
jail sentence. 
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Despite the trial court's imposition of contempt sanctions, 
Alan failed to make any ongoing alimony payments or payments 
toward the $9,800.00 judgment. Therefore, Lynda was forced to 
file a second Order to Show Cause to seek an increase of the 
judgment and the issuance of a Warrant for Alan's arrest. All 
issues in Lynda's second Order to Show Cause were certified for 
evidentiary hearing, which was held on June 4, 2003. After 
hearing evidence, the trial court again ordered Alan to serve 30 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail. This jail time was 
temporarily purged due to Alan's immediately tendering $1,000.00 
to Lynda and payment of at least $100.00 per month to her during 
the pendency of the modification action. 
At the time of the divorce, Lynda earned approximately 
$25,000.00 per year. At the time of trial of the Petition to 
Modify, Lynda testified that she had advanced in her field and 
was presently earning approximately $48,000.00 per year from her 
employment. Lynda testified that her net monthly income was 
$3,062.28 and that her monthly living expenses were $3,367.00. 
In her statement of expenses, Lynda did not include any 
allowances for her clothing or dry cleaning expenditures. See, 
Petitioner's Trial Exhibit 9 at Section 4. The trial court 
found that in light of Lynda's professional position, it was 
reasonable to increase her stated budget to include the expense 
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for her clothing and dry cleaning and increased her expenses by 
$300.00. See, trial court's Memorandum Decision at Page 4. 
At the close of evidence, the trial court requested that 
each party submit a post-trial brief on the issue of imputation 
in income to Alan. Lynda submitted her brief on September 30, 
2003. Alan failed to file his post-trial brief. On October 31, 
2003, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, a copy of 
which is included in the Addendum of this Brief. Specifically, 
the trial court found that the sole basis for modifying Alan's 
alimony obligation was due to Lynda's increased income, which 
has resulted in a lessening of her financial need. The trial 
court went on to find Alan to be willfully underemployed and 
that it was proper for alimony purposes to impute to him his 
average income from his employment at Lawson. Thus, the trial 
court reduced Alan's alimony obligation from $1,400.00 per month 
to $500.00 per month effective September 2003. Judgment was 
also entered against Alan for all alimony remaining unpaid from 
the period of November 2001 through August 2003 at the previous 
rate in the amount of $29,700.00. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: 
Under Utah law, a trial court in a divorce modification 
action is afforded a wide latitude of discretion is fashioning a 
remedy which will fit the financial needs of the parties. 
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Decisions that fall within that ambit of discretion will not be 
disturbed unless the Appellant is able to demonstrate that the 
trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law or found facts 
not supported by the evidence. In this case, the Appellant has 
failed in his burden to demonstrate any error on the part of the 
trial court in connection with this or any issue raised in 
Appellant's Brief. 
Point II: 
Under Utah Law, a trial court may appropriately impute 
income to an unemployed or underemployed party for the 
determination of that party's ability to produce sufficient 
income. In the instant case, the trial court correctly imputed 
income to Alan when the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates 
that Alan is voluntarily underemployed and has opted for his 
lowered income status as a lifestyle choice rather than as a 
result of poor health or lack of reasonable employment 
opportunities. 
Point III: 
Under Utah law, the trial court is not required to make 
alimony modifications retroactive to the time a petition for 
modification was filed. Further, due to the Appellant's 
inexcusable delay in prosecuting this action, a retroactive 
modification would have been adverse to public policy and would 
have been inequitable to the Appellee. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT IN A DIVORCE 
ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE 
IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPLLICATION OF 
THE LAW OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING 
IN A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR SERIOUS INEQUITY 
The Appellant, Alan, contends that the trial court erred in 
its reduced alimony award to Lynda, the Appellee, and 
consequently, abused the wide discretion afforded it in making 
such an order. The evidence presented to the trial court 
clearly shows that this was not the case. 
In order to prevail on this appeal, Alan is required to 
show that the trial court, in making its modified alimony award, 
misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered findings not 
supported by the evidence, or caused a serious inequity so as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion. See, English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409,410 (Utah 1977). 
In the context of an alimony modification, "[o]nce a party 
has established that a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseen at the time of the divorce has 
occurred, the trial court must then consider what a reasonable 
alimony award is in light of that change." See, Bolliger v. 
Bolliger, 2002 UT App 47, % 22, 997 P. 2d 903. In the instant 
matter, neither party disputes that Lynda's increased income 
constitutes this substantial change of circumstance. 
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The factors to be considered by the trial court in 
determining the reasonableness of a modified alimony award are 
those codified at UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (2003) at Section 30-3-5(8) 
which include, in part: (i) the financial condition and needs of 
the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or 
ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage. These 
are commonly referred to as the Jones factors. See also, 
Bolliger at 1 23, quoting Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 
1103, 1105-06 (Utah App. 1999); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985) . "If these factors have been considered, we 
will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." See, Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, I 26, 9 
P. 3d 171 (citations and quotations omitted). In the instant 
matter, the trial court carefully examined and made supported 
findings on each of the above factors. 
At trial Lynda's present income, ability to earn and stated 
financial needs were uncontroverted, as was the length of the 
parties' marriage.1 The thrust of the trial court analysis went 
1
 The trial court specifically questioned Lynda about her 
professional clothing and dry cleaning needs. Lynda testified 
that due to Alan's lack of support payments, that these were 
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to the ability of Alan to earn income sufficient to provide the 
financial support that Lynda requires. The trial court heard 
Alan's testimony that he voluntarily quit working for the 
company who had employed him for a number of years and where he 
had consistently earned between $70,000.00 and $160,000.00 per 
year. Alan then testified that he did not attempt to secure new 
employment in his field either in the Salt Lake Valley or in 
Montana before quitting, but rather chose to remain unemployed 
as his lifestyle choice. Despite surgery and complications in 
2002, Alan testified that he was in good physical health and 
within months had resumed working full-time albeit as a delivery 
truck driver earning $8.00 an hour. Based upon Alan's own 
testimony, the trial court properly found that Alan retained the 
ability to earn at his former levels and therefore could 
continue to provide financial support to Lynda. 
The trial court made specific findings on each Jones factor 
and the record amply supports these findings. Therefore, Alan 
has not in any sense met his burden on appeal and, therefore, 
items she was trying to get by without. The trial court found 
that this was unreasonable and increased Lynda's monthly budget 
by $300.00 to accommodate these needs. Alan did not object to 
this line of questioning nor did he refute the trial court's 
assessment. 
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the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPUTION OD INCOME TO 
THE APPELLANT WAS APPROPRIATE, 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW 
It is appropriate for a trial court to impute income to an 
unemployed or underemployed spouse as part of the determination 
of that spouse's ability to earn income for the purpose of 
analyzing the Jones factors. See, i.e., Cox v. Cox, 877 p.2d 
1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994), Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 
1024 (Utah App. 1993) (each holding that a trial court must first 
determine that a spouse is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed before imputing income)(emphasis original). See 
also, Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 936 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that 
imputation of income to a spouse was appropriate where the payor 
spouse had a significant history of earning a higher income, 
that the spouse voluntarily quit this higher paying employment 
and did so without regard of the financial impact on the 
recipient spouse) . This Court has articulated the goal of 
imputing income is to prevent spouses from reducing their 
alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment. See, 
Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah App. 1998), 
citing Hill at Id. 
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In the instant matter, this trial court previously 
determined that Alan was voluntarily underemployed in its May 
2002 ruling, as follows: 
MThat the Respondent has the ability to continue to 
meet his Court ordered obligation. The Court finds 
that the Respondent has ample resources available to 
him through a $120,000.00 inheritance received from 
his mother's estate and a $60,000.00 lump sum 
retirement payment received when Respondent 
voluntarily terminated his previous employment. 
Further, Respondent elected to voluntarily terminate 
his employment before securing new employment in the 
Salt Lake Valley. Just prior to Respondent refusing 
to pay his alimony obligation in September 2001, the 
Respondent made informal lump sum settlement offers of 
at least $12,000.00 to Petitioner. The Respondent 
then remarried and relocated with his present wife to 
Helena Montana, again, without investigating the job 
market and without securing employment. The 
Respondent remained unemployed for nearly one year and 
is presently underemployed earning $6.00 per hour, 
part time, when his recent earning history 
demonstrates that Respondent earned over $100,000.00 
per year. Finally, the Respondent willfully ignored 
Commissioner Arnett's 2001 judgment against the 
Respondent in the amount of $2,800.00, that Respondent 
has recently provided as much as $9,000.00 to the 
parties1 adult daughter to defray some of her wedding 
expenses." 
See, Order and Judgment Re: Contempt, Attorney's Fees, Alimony 
Arrears and Other Matters at Paragraph 1 (b) . Further evidence 
produced at trial in this matter supports the finding that Alan 
continued to be drastically underemployed based on his health, 
job skills and demonstrated work history. Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly imputed income to Alan. See, Hall at 
1024. 
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Similar to the facts in Hill, Alan chose to drastically 
reduce his income; from earnings of over $100,000.00 per year to 
$8.00 per hour full time. Under these circumstances, it was 
appropriate to impute Alan's prior income to him as part of this 
Court's determination of his ability to produce income and 
contribute to the ongoing support of Lynda. See, Cox at 1267. 
In his Brief, as he did at the trial of this matter, Alan 
makes great issue of the burden of alimony on his post-divorce 
lifestyle choices. Our laws have long considered marriage a 
contract, which while soluble, carries with it obligations which 
outlast the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony. Chief among 
these lasting obligations is the duty to support a financially 
dependent spouse or child, or in other words, to place the other 
party in the position they would have enjoyed had the marriage 
contract not been terminated. Alan, like all citizens, has the 
right to live and work as he chooses and a court may not 
infringe upon these rights absent compelling circumstances. 
However, Alan, like all citizens, has the duty to live up to 
reasonable court-ordered obligations and a court has the right 
to make equitable orders designed to ensure these obligations 
are met. 
The trial court's finding that Alan retains the ability to 
meet a reasonable support obligation is supported Utah law and 
the record herein, and most notably that provided by Alan's own 
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testimony. While Alan may not like being bound by his 
obligation to continue to pay a reasonable sum in alimony, the 
trial court's ruling was sound and should not be disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY MODIFIED THE 
APPELLANT'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO BE 
EFFECTIVE AFTER THE TRIAL OF HIS 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
Although unclear in his reasons as to why, Alan in his 
Brief contends that the trial court's prospective application of 
the modified alimony award is "inequitable." Alan provides much 
rhetoric for his position, but fails to provide this Court with 
any guidance by way of case or statute as to why the trial 
court's prospective ruling is inequitable or incorrect. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (2003) § 78-45-9.3(4) states, in relevant 
part, that a "child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period during 
which a modification is pending, but only from the date of 
service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the 
petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the 
effective date of the modification shall be the month following 
service on the parent whose support is affected." (emphasis 
added). This statute is clear and precise in its mandate. 
While a court may chose to make a support modification 
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retroactive, the only instance in which retroactive modification 
is required is in the modification of child support orders. 
This is supported by the Legislature's choice to use the case-
specific term "parent" when discussing the mandatory 
retroactivity, but uses the general terms "obligor" and 
"obligee" throughout the rest of this statute. 
"
 AWhen interpreting statutes we determine the statute's 
meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and 
give effect to the plain language unless the language is 
ambiguous.1 " See, Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt. , 2004 UT 12, SI 
12, 84 P.3d 1201 (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, SI 8, 
63 P. 3d 667. The plain language of the above statute, read in 
its clearest terms, supports the trial court's decision not to 
make to alimony modification retroactive. 
The trial court's prospective modification is supported by 
statute and also by public policy. Alan filed his modification 
action claiming that he had experienced a "significant, material 
and permanent reduction" of his income. See, Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce at Paragraph 3(a)(emphasis added). Alan filed 
his modification petition in October 2001 and never certified 
the matter as being ready for trial despite having alleged the 
existence of permanent grounds for modification. It was only 
after Lynda was forced to bring Alan's contempt before the 
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district court for a second time was this matter set for trial 
nearly two (2) years after the Petition to Modify was filed. 
If he had evidence of permanent grounds (not the temporary 
grounds hinted at by Alan in his Brief) to reduce or eliminate 
his alimony obligation as alleged in his Petition to Modify, 
then Alan should have moved this matter quickly to trial rather 
than letting it languish for two years. Indeed, after failing 
to prosecute his matter, a true inequity would have resulted to 
Lynda if the trial court had made its relief retroactive by two 
years rather than prospective as of trial. The trial court's 
ruling was correct by statute and supported by the public policy 
of concluding litigation in the most expedient manner. 
Therefore, the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the Appellant's Brief, it becomes clear that 
the Appellant has taken what can be properly described as a 
"shotgun approach" in connection with this appeal. Such an 
approach is not appropriate nor should it even be sanctioned. 
The Appellee has fully addressed each of the issues raised 
by the Appellant and has specifically demonstrated that there 
was more than adequate evidence to support each of the trial 
court's findings of fact and the resulting orders of the court. 
The decision of the trial court and the concomitant findings 
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were thorough, well reasoned, consistent with existing law and 
more than fair to the Appellant. 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed in its 
entirety. Further, the Appellee should be awarded her costs and 
fees related to this appeal. The case should be remanded for a 
determination of those fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December, 2004. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
KimirML 
AMYfE. 
A t td s^n^ 
HAYES 
y s f o r ioner/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be hand-delivered 
to: 
Mr. Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
L -hwf 
AMY\E. I 
AttoXne 
HAYES 
y for Petitioner/Appellee 
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KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105 
Anderson & Dunn , 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 100 !. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 , >J . 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 ! 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
"i-is-qa-B-ibcw,, 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The above-entitled action came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, one of the judges in the above-
entitled court, on the 16th day of June, 1992. The Plaintiff 
was present and was represented by her counsel of record, 
Suzanne Benson, and the Defendant was present and represented 
by his counsel of record, Kevin V. Olsen. In the presence of 
the Court, the parties entered into a written stipulation with 
the modifications that were stated in the record and set forth 
in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
Court, after accepting the parties1 Stipulation, after hearing 
FlL^BiofRICT«mi!IIT 
Third Judicial District 
' "JUL 1 4 1992 
LYNDA F . JONES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Defendant. 
-2-
proffers from the parties on the issue of tax exemptions, and 
after having taken the proofs of the Plaintiff and making its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and otherwise being 
fully advised of the premises, now orders as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Plaintiff's complaint for divorce is granted 
and the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties is hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby made 
free from all obligations by reason thereof. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of parties1 minor child, subject to Defend-
ant's reasonable right to visitation. 
3. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded $495.00 per 
month as child support and that said support shall continue 
through the minor child's graduation in June, 1993. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to maintain in effect a 
policy of dental, health and accident insurance at all times 
that such may be available through his employer at a reason-
able cost, with the parties1 minor child named as beneficiary 
thereunder. Further, the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay 
routine uninsured medical and dental expenses, including 
-3-
routine office visits, physical examinations and immunization 
pursuant to UCA § 78-45-7.15(2). Each party is hereby 
ordered to pay one-half of all other reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical and dental expenses for the said minor child. 
5. The Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff $905.00 each month for alimony during the period 
that the child support is ordered paid. After the child 
support terminates, it is hereby ordered that the alimony 
award shall automatically increase to $1,400.00 each month. 
The Defendant's obligation to pay said alimony shall terminate 
upon the death, co-habitation or re-marriage of the Plaintiff. 
6. The personal property is hereby awarded 
to the parties as they have heretofore divided and distributed 
it with the exception that the chest and the box of year books 
are hereby awarded to the Defendant and the Defendant is 
ordered to return the photographs to the Plaintiff within one 
month after he has had an opportunity to have those photos 
duplicated. 
7. It is hereby ordered that the life insurance 
policies currently in force shall be continued naming the 
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children as beneficiaries, with the policy on the Plaintiff's 
life being paid for by the Plaintiff and the policy on the 
Defendant's life being paid for by the Defendant. 
8. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall 
continue health insurance on the party's adult child, Adrienne 
for so long as such insurance is available and needed because 
of her pre-existing health condition and it is ordered that the 
cost of premiums for said insurance shall be shared equally 
between the parties. 
9. It is hereby ordered that the home and residence 
located at 1768 Mombo Drive, Sandy, Utah, 84092, shall be 
placed on the market for sale immediately after the minor 
child graduates from high school in June 1993 and that the 
said residence shall be sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner with the parties sharing equally in the equity that is 
realized after deducting the costs of sale. Until the home is 
sold, the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to be responsible for 
the first and second mortgage payments. She shall not receive 
a credit for those payments. Further, the Plaintiff shall 
have exclusive possession and use of the home until it is sold 
r\ 
-5-
and she is hereby ordered to be responsible for keeping and 
maintaining the property in a condition similar to that that 
the parties enjoyed when they were living together. 
11. It is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall 
pay the actual cost of the automobile insurance premium for 
the minor child, Eric, up to the amount of $1,013.20 each year 
until the minor child reaches the age of twenty-one (21). 
12. The parties are hereby ordered to be respons-
ible for and pay those obligations as they currently are 
divided. 
13. It is hereby ordered that the parties shall 
share the federal and state tax exemption for the minor child 
by alternating the exemption on a yearly basis for those years 
that the child is claimed as an exemption, with the Defendant 
being awarded the tax exemption the first tax year of 1992, the 
Plaintiff being awarded the tax exemption the next tax year of 
1993, etc. 
14. Each party is hereby awarded one-half of the 
other party's retirement benefits, profit sharing, and other 
similar benefit earned or accrued by either of them during the 
period of their marriage. This award is subject to a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order where appropriate. 
-6-
15. The parties are each ordered to execute in a 
timely fashion all documents that are necessary and reasonable 
to effectuate the provisions of the stipulation. In part-
icular, each party is hereby ordered to cooperate in the 
transfer of title to the automobiles to the owner thereof. 
16. Each party is hereby ordered to pay their own 
attorney fees and costs that they have, incurred in this matter. 
this / ' * * c-^^ DATED day of <J-fee", T992. 
By the^Cpurt: 
district Court Judge 
form: 
V ^ A ^ A -
zapne Berrson 
Attoiyzey for P l a in t i f f 
-^1%!^", 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to 
Suzanne Benson at The Hermes Building, Suite 200, 455 East 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this /ffA day of 
June, 1992. 
'A/1A& 'CnAQ. 
£U(n 
STEPHEN G HOMER (1536) 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone (801) 561-9665 
Attorney for Defendant-Petitioner ALAN D JONES 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA F JONES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs 
ALAN D JONES, 
Defendant-Petitioner 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED PETITION 
TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
[ALIMONY PROVISIONS] 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Case assigned to Judge Lewis 
The Defendant-Petitioner ALAN D JONES hereby petitions the 
Court for a modification of the Decree of Divorce in the above-
entitled action, based upon the following: 
1. The parties hereto were divorced pursuant to that certain 
"Decree of Divorce" entered by this Court on or about 14 July 1992. 
2. The original Decree of Divorce has not been subsequently 
modified. 
3. Subsequent to the entry of the aforementioned Decree of 
Divorce, there have occurred substantial and material changes in 
the circumstances of the parties, not reasonably anticipated at the 
time of the entry of the original Decree, including but not limited 
to: 
a. a significant, material and permanent reduction in 
the income and/or earning-capacity of the Defendant-
Petitioner ALAN D JONES; 
b. the present and future ability and capacity of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent LYNDA F JONES to now fully provide 
for her own economic well-being and financial support. 
These substantial and material changes in circumstances warrant a 
reexamination and reconsideration of the permanent award of alimony 
and the revocation and termination thereof. 
4. Paragraph 10 of the original Decree of Divorce required 
the Defendant to pay $905 each month for alimony as long as there 
were minor dependent children residing with the Plaintiff and for 
whom the Defendant-Petitioner was ordered to pay monthly child 
support. Paragraph 10 of the original Decree of Divorce 
automatically increased the alimony award to $1,400 per month 
following the termination of the child support payments for the 
minor children. 
5. The alimony award of the original Decree of Divorce was 
based upon the Defendant's "stipulated1' per Paragraph 4 of the 
Stipulation earnings in excess of $5,000 per month. 
6. The Defendant ALAN D JONES presently is unemployed and is 
unable to make the court-ordered alimony payments in the amounts 
specified in the original decree. 
7. The Plaintiff is employed and earns, to the best of 
Defendant's knowledge and belief, in excess of $2000 per month. 
8. The Plaintiff-Respondent LYNDA F JONES is in good health, 
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is educated, and is full-time employed in a career or occupation of 
her own choosing, has no dependents relying on her for support, and 
is fully capable of providing her for her own financial support 
without the continuing obligation on the part of the Defendant-
Petitioner to pay permanent alimony long after the marriage has 
terminated. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant-Petitioner ALAN D JONES prays for 
judgment in favor of the Defendant-Petitioner ALAN D JONES and 
against the Plaintiff-Respondent LYNDA F JONES as follows: 
a. That the Court require the Plaintiff-Respondent 
LYNDA F JONES, following service of a summons, to appear 
and answer these allegations. 
b. That the Court require the Plaintiff-Respondent 
LYNDA F JONES to make full disclosure of her earnings 
and/or earning capacity and such other information as the 
Court may require pertinent to any future alimony 
obligation on the part of the Defendant-Petitioner. 
c. That the Court enter an order modifying the original 
Decree of Divorce, to effect an adjustment of the alimony 
support amounts to be paid by the Defendant-Petitioner 
ALAN D JONES to the Plaintiff-Respondent LYNDA F JONES, 
to reduce said monthly alimony payments to zero. 
d. That the Court require each party to bear their own 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in this proceeding. 
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e. That the Court grant such further relief as may be 
properly before the Court. 
Dated this / / day of October, 2001. 
Att^rney-f€r Defendant-Petitioner 
ALAN D JONES 
VERIFICATION 
The foregoing statements contained in the DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE [ALIMONY PROVISIONS] are true 
to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this /rf —day of October, 2001^ . /fJ^^ 
ALAN D JONES 
STATE OF MONTANA ) 
/ / ) s f 
COUNTY OF/jTt/s *Clr>thl£. 
On the /y -" day of October, 2001, ALAN D JONES personally 
appeared before me and, on his oath, acknowledged to me that the 
statements contained in the foregoing DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED PETITION 
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE [ALIMONY PROVISIONS] are true and 
correct, to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
(J.(a~ ( C -'A-V 
'UBLIC 
PLAINTIFF'S PRESENT ADDRESS 
LYNDA F JONES 
2734 Hartford Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENT ADDRESS 
ALAN D JONES 
301 Best Place Road 
Helena, Montana 59602 
tB8> 
NOTARIALsJ 
\ SEAL 
STEPHEN Q HOMER fl-K> 
AMY E. HAYES (7882) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Facsimile: (801) 355-2513 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Third Judicial District 
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SALT COUNT* 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ALAN D, JONES, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT RE: 
CONTEMPT OF COURT, ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, ALIMONY ARREARS AND 
OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
-0O0-
The above-referenced matter came on regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on May 8, 2002, at 9:30 a.m. Petitioner was present and 
repicseiited by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present 
and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. The Court, having heard and considered 
the evidence adduced in this matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The elements of Respondent's contempt of court have been proven without question by 
clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the Court finds that: 
a. Respondent not only knew of this Court's Order that he pay alimony in the 
monthly amount of $1,400.00 to Petitioner, but agreed that this order be entered by 
stipulation. Respondent clearly knew of his obligation; 
b. The Court finds that Respondent has the ability to continue to meet his Court 
ordered obligation. The Court finds that Respondent has ample resources available to him 
through a $120,000.00 inheritance received from his mother's estate and a $60,000.00 lump-
sum retirement payment received when Respondent voluntarily terminated his previous 
employment. Further, Respondent elected to voluntarily terminate his employment before 
securing new employment in the Salt Lake valley. Just prior to Respondent refusing to pay 
his alimony obligation in September, 2001, Respondent made informal lump-sum settlement 
offers of at least $12,000.00 to Petitioner. Respondent then remarried and relocated with his 
present wife to Helena. Montana, again, without investigating the job market and securing 
employment. Respondent remained unemployed for nearly one year, and is presently 
underemployed earning $6.00 an hour part-time, when his recent earnings history 
demonstrates Respondent earned over $100,000.00 per year. Finally, Respondent willfully 
ignored Commissioner Arnett's November, 2001, judgment against Respondent in the 
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amount of $2,800.00, Respondent has recently provided as much as $9,000.00 to the parties" 
adult daughter to defray some of her wedding expenses. 
c. Despite being fully aware of his alimony obligation, and despite having ample 
resources available to him and having voluntarily reduced his income substantially, 
Respondent has failed to pay his alimony obligation from September 1, 2001, through the 
date of this hearing. Respondent's total alimony obligation for this time is $12,600.00. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Respondent is found in contempt of Court for having willfully and knowingly failed to 
pay his Court ordered alimony obligation to Petitioner. 
2. Judgment is entered against Respondent in the amount of $12,600.00 as and for unpaid 
alimony from September 1, 2001, up to and including May, 2002. 
3. Respondent is sentenced to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail, said 
sentence having been temporarily purged by Respondent's immediate tendering of payment of the 
full amount of Commissioner Arnett's initial judgment of $2,800.00. 
4. If the remaining $9,800.00 of this Court's Judgment is not paid within six (6) months after 
this Order, Respondent shall surrender himself to the Salt Lake County Jail and serve this Court's 
thirty (30) day sentence. 
5. A monetary fine against Respondent is not imposed at this time. 
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6. Petitioner is awarded her reasonable attorney's fees associated with prosecuting this 
contempt action in an amount to be determined by this Court. 
7. By Stipulation of the parties, the term of alimony shall be defined as not to exceed the 
length of the parties' marriage. 
8. Respondent's Petition to Modify is set for evidentiary hearing on July 18, 2002, at 9:30 
a.m., before this Court. 
9. Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the parties are ordered to exchange their complete 
tax returns for the years 1994 through the present. 
10. The parties are further ordered to complete all additional discovery necessary within 
thirty (30) days of this Court's Order. 
DATED this tX' day of nXji/^A 2002. 
THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^ ' 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 2002, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be [x] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [x] sent via facsimile to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 561-9818 
Attorney for Respondent 
9225 South Redwood Rd., Ste. B 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
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AMY E. HAYES (7882) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Facsimile: (801) 355-2513 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
ORDER IN RE: JUDGEMENT 
CONTEMPT AND OTHER 
MATTERS 
Civil No. 914900581DA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
-oOo-
The above referenced matter came on regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge, on June 4, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. Petitioner was present and 
represented by her counsel, Amy E. Hayes, of Dart Adamson & Donovan. Respondent was present 
and represented by his counsel, Stephen G. Homer, Esq. The Court having heard and considered the 
evidence adduced in this matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Respondent is in arrears regarding his Court ordered alimony payments to 
Petitioner. 
2. Respondent has the ability to have made alimony payments to Petitioner. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Respondent is to serve 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. This jail time is stayed 
for 10 days to allow for the Respondent time to purge the jail sentence. Jail time may be purged with 
a $1,000.00 check or money order received by Petitioner's counsel by June 14,2003. A $25,000.00 
warrant for Respondent's arrest will be held until June 16, 2003, to allow Respondent to make this 
payment. If Respondent does not make this initial payment, Petitioner's counsel shall notify the 
Court and the warrant will be issued immediately. 
2. In addition to the payment of $1,000.00, Respondent is to pay $100.00 per month to 
Petitioner. The first $100.00 is due on or before July 31, 2003, thereafter due the last day of each 
month. If at any time the monthly $100.00 payment is not made, the arrest warrant shall issue. 
3. Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce shall be dismissed unless all medical 
records relating to any medical reasons for Respondent not working over the past year are produced. 
If these records have not been produced to Petitioner's counsel by noon, June 11,2003, Respondent's 
Petition to Modify shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Not withstanding the above, Respondent's Petition to Modify shall be heard by this Court 
on August 13, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. At this time, Respondent should be prepared to present to the 
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Court specific information regarding whether the Respondent chose to leave his previous 
employment or whether he was asked to do so. 
me, 2 DATED this \\ day of % e , 003. 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Rule 4-504 Notice 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that any objection to the 
foregoing Order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days of after service of 
this Order. 
DATED thisc)3 day of June, 2003. 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
w AMY\E.tIAYES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ Q ^ day of June, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be [x] mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [ ] sent via facsimile to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
9225 South Redwood Rd., Ste. B 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
CI WILLIAMS 
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AMY E. HAYES (7882) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
Facsimile: (801) 355-2513 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LYNDA F. JONES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S FINANCIAL 
DECLARATION (AUGUST 2003) 
Civil No. 91490058IDA 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
-oOo-
Name: Lynda Jones 
Address: 2734 Hartford Street 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
529-66-1482 
Fund Raiser 
Hale Centre Theatre 
3333 S Decker Lake Drive 
West Valley City UT 84119 
Number of exemptions taken: 1 
Birth Date: 3/15/45 
Social Security No.: 
Occupation: 
Employer: 
Employer Address: 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS & LIABILITIES 
1 GROSS MONTHLY INCOME: 
From salary and wages, including commissions, 
bonuses, overtime and allowances) $4,250.00 
Pensions and retirement 
Social Security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividend interest 
Rents 
All other sources (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: $4,250.00 
2 MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: 
Federal income tax $549.56 
State income tax 225.52 
FICA 325.14 
Health insurance 87.50 
Life insurance 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 
401(k) 
Savings plan 
Credit union 
Other (specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: $1,187.72 
3. NET MONTHLY INCOME: (Attach current 
income verification) $3,062.28 
MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) PITI $1,407.40 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 50.00 
Food and household supplies 300.00 
Utilities: 
Electricity 40.00 
Natural gas 54.00 
Water, sewer and garbage 50.00 
Telephone 100.00 
Laundry and dry cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental 
Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, 
disability: excluding deductions from wages 
in item 2, above) , 71.00 
Child care 
Payment of child support or alimony from 
a prior marriage 
School 
Entertainment 120.00 
Gifts and donations 100.00 
Transportation 
Auto expense 100.00 
Auto payments 
Installment payments (from item 4, above, 
not including above) 
Other expenses (specify) 975.00 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES $3,367.00 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I swear that all of the information contained herein is true and correct-
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jf day of ( AAA ^ /UJM 2003 
Notary Public I 
MARILEE WALKER 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
Septembers 2005 
State of Utah 
^ >— f w° * •<u* jra. w * jsm « 
If 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: ^L^Ur ^t 2~005~~ 
s™w^fllw%£V'W. *'' y? 
HALE CENTRE THEATRE 
3333 5. DECKER LAKE DRIVE 801-984-9000 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UT 84119 
Earnings Statement 
Period Ending: 
Pay Date: 
07/31/2003 
08/05/2003 
9 
Earnings^ 
Regular 
Taxable Marital Status; Single 
Exemptions/Allowances; 
Federal; 3 
State; 3 
Social Security Number^ 
rate hours 
3125;oo ;;., ; ,, "~" 
thfe period^ y a r to dato 
^ I P l J & l 31,875.00 
Deductions statutory 
Federal Inqome Tax 
Soe>a} Secunty T a x - " 
Medicare Tax 
UT State Income Tax 
Other 
-'274.78 
-30.61 
-115.76 
Aflac ' Postfix 
Checking 
in 
-43,75 
-1,531.15 
4,305.29 
462.19 
1,691.40 
LYNDA F. JONES 
2734 HARTFORD STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106 
Your federal taxable wages this period ara 
$2,125.00 
:?.•• f r .;•• -v t i ^ r ^ i 1: • . v * *;,;/-/ v,-' •;••••' •'.•:. -, .\ 
IvmiA^adNEs 
H W F * * 
i> ^/TF 
NON-NEGOTIASL6 
By-
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 3 1 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
—1r Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA F. JONES 
Petitioner, 
vs 
ALAN D. JONES, 
Respondent, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 914900581 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on August 
14, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the 
matter under advisement in order to give counsel an opportunity to 
submit post-trial briefs and additional documentation. The 
petitioner filed her Post-Trial Brief on September 30, 2003. The 
respondent did not file a post-trial brief and the time for doing 
so has now expired. 
The Court has now had an opportunity to review the 
respondent's Petition to Modify, seeking to eliminate the 
respondent's alimony obligation, along with the remaining pleadings 
that have been filed and the exhibits that were presented into 
evidence. The Court has also revisited portions of the trial 
testimony and counsel's closing arguments. Finally, the Court has 
reviewed the petitioner's Post-Trial Brief and the case law cited 
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therein. Therefore, the Court is now fully advised and rules as 
stated, herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The respondent contends that his Petition to Modify is 
premised on two changes in circumstance that occurred subsequent to 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and which were not contemplated 
by either party. Specifically, the respondent points to the 
substantial reduction in his income or earning capacity and to the 
petitioner's increased ability to provide for her own economic 
well-being because of the gradual, but steady increase in her 
income and earning capacity. 
The Court's preliminary indication at the bench trial was that 
there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
which requires a modification in the respondent's alimony 
obligation. The Court now clarifies that this change in 
circumstance arises solely because of the petitioner's increased 
ability to meet her own financial needs and not because of the 
respondent's decision to earn less than he is capable of earning, 
particularly given his lengthy experience in the sales industry. 
Specifically, the Court reiterates its prior finding that the 
respondent has voluntarily reduced his earning capacity with no 
basis for doing so. In other words, the Court is persuaded that 
the respondent did not have to leave Lawson Products because of a 
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change in the management scheme or because his earning potential 
would have decreased, or for any other viable reason. 
Further, the Court is unpersuaded that the respondent's 
current underemployment is necessitated by any health concerns or 
physical impediments. To the contrary, the respondent's trial 
testimony was that he is currently in good health. In the end, the 
respondent's counsel articulated it best when he said that his 
client left Lawson Products because he simply intended to earn 
less. Counsel went on to question whether there was anything 
morally wrong with such a decision and how long the respondent 
should continue to be "enslaved" by his alimony obligation. The 
Court addressed these issues during the bench trial by emphasizing 
that she is concerned only with the legal issue of whether the 
respondent's voluntary underemployment obviates his alimony 
obligation. The Court concludes that while a person may choose to 
change careers or choose to earn less; this voluntary act does 
not obviate alimony. Therefore, this Court imputes to the 
respondent the full amount of income represented by his earning 
history prior to his voluntary departure from Lawson Products. 
In contrast to the respondent's decision to voluntarily leave 
his job in order to "earn less," the petitioner has steadily 
progressed in her career and now earns approximately double what 
she earned at the time of the Decree of Divorce. Ironically, 
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however, it is the fruits of the petitioner's hard work and 
diligence that now provide the sole legal basis for the respondent 
to claim a change in circumstances and seek to modify his alimony 
obligation. 
Having determined that the petitioner's earning capacity has 
dramatically increased, the question becomes to what extent the 
Court should modify the respondent's alimony obligation. Using the 
petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a reference point, the 
Court concludes that the petitioner is entitled to an amount of 
alimony that will address her unmet financial needs. In this 
regard, the Court finds that the petitioner has understated those 
unmet needs to be approximately $3 0 0 per month. Taking into 
account a reasonable amount of expenses associated with clothing 
and dry-cleaning, the Court concludes that the petitioner's unmet 
needs are closer to $500 per month. Therefore, the Court grants 
the respondent's Petition, finding a change in petitioner's income, 
and orders a modification of respondent's alimony from $1,400 to 
$500 per month. 
Counsel for the petitioner is to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law consistent with, but not limited to, this 
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Memorandum Decision. Each party is to bear their own attorney's 
fees . 
Dated this % day of October, 2003. 
p 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
a^njk 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this 7l\ day of 
October, 2003: 
Amy E. Hayes 
Attorney for Petitioner 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney for Respondent 
9225 S. Redwood Road, Suite B 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
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